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 Each year, the United States Federal government procures goods and services in an 
amount that exceeds three percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. Federal acquisitions 
are subject to binding legislative guidance, including the expansive Federal Acquisition 
Regulations and agency-specific supplements. In addition, contracting firms face oversight from 
a variety of executive sub-agencies, all of whom monitor ongoing and ex post performance. 
Uncle Sam enjoys virtually unlimited power to reclaim previously disbursed revenues, to debar 
(or ban) misbehaving contractors from future government business, and to imprison and fine 
contracting miscreants. Despite the unique nature of the business environment and the monetary 
importance of Federal contracting, prior literature generally ignores the determinants of 
contractor misconduct. Whether and to what extent firm characteristics predict a range of 
misbehavior, covering a span from minor statutory violations to fraud commission, is the subject 
of this paper. We exploit a hybrid research design that combines both within- and between-
sample elements and document a consistent association between certain contractor characteristics 
and misconduct commission and severity. We also find that artifacts of the awarding agency 
display a predictable relationship with contractor misconduct, underscoring the complex 











“Procurement fraud includes, but is not limited to, cost and labor mischarging, defective 
pricing, price fixing, bid rigging, and defective and counterfeit parts. The potential 
damage…extends well beyond financial losses1.“ 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 Imagine walking into your local superstore. You need bread, milk, and toilet paper. The 
store is out of these items, so you pay for them in exchange for an I.O.U. Now imagine that 
instead of consumables, you were purchasing services, and rather than $30, this purchase cost 
$2.7 million. Except you never received the goods. This is the situation in which the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) recently found itself. A contractor, Michael Kitrel, was charged 
with conspiracy to commit larceny using government money. Between 2014 and 2019, Kitrel 
defrauded the DoD of over $2 million dollars in a scheme that involved establishing shell 
companies to sell the government non-existent goods and services. Although this example is a 
fabulously extravagant display of misconduct, deviant contractor behavior is a frequent 
occurrence in the Federal contracting milieu. 
Apart from the natural intrigue all humans feel when learning of other parties’ foibles and 
follies, what is the value of studying Federal government procurement contract misbehavior? In 
2017, the Federal government’s procurement activities amounted to more than three percent of 
the nation’s gross domestic product;  the U.S. government contract awards contracts with a total 
value $400 billion annually (Heese and Cavazos, 2019). The sheer quantity of money changing 
hands and the volume of requisitions suggest that contractors have ample opportunity to cut 
corners, both illegally and extra-legally. Anecdotal evidence suggests the extra-legal avenue of 
 
1 Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense, Semiannual Report to Congress (2018) 
 
 
misbehavior is rapidly expanding2. Hard evidence supports this assertion. According to a 2018 
report from the Department of Defense (DOD), the DOD executed nearly 16 million contracts 
totaling $334 billion between 2013 and 2017 and had criminal convictions during that period that 
resulted in recovery of $792 million from fines, penalties, restitution, and forfeiture of property3. 
Despite the magnitude of the issue, contractor misconduct is relatively underexplored in 
scholarly literature4.  
In this paper, we study the characteristics of those firms who receive procurement contracts 
from the U.S. Federal government and empirically assess the firm-specific characteristics that 
affect the firm’s propensity to commit procurement misbehavior. Using a sample of instances of 
misconduct ranging from relatively minor statutory violations up to and including outright fraud 
(such as the Kitrel case), we find that certain characteristics of the contracting firm are 
consistently associated with the propensity to commit different types of misbehavior5. These 
characteristics predict not only the probability of a contractor infraction but also are associated 
with misconduct severity. We exploit a within- and between-subjects research design that uses 
deviant firms as their own control. Using a long time-series panel reduces some of the concerns 
endemic to these model specifications and also mitigates the potential that unobservable, 
correlated omitted variables drive our reported results.   
Interestingly, we find that not only firm characteristics but also the awarding agencies 
themselves are predictably associated with the commission of procurement misconduct. The 
prevalence of both customer and provider level predictors for misbehavior hint at the rich 
 
2 The source for this anecdote is a Senior Manager specializing in government contractors at a Big 4 firm. 
3 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. December, 2018. Report to Congress 
Section 889 of the FY 2018 NDAA Report on Defense Contracting Fraud. 
4 Heese and Cavazos (2019) is a recent exception. We discuss their findings in Section 2.2. 
5 Misbehavior falls into one of 15 classifications listed in Table 1.  
 
 
institutional setting surrounding government requisitions. Our results help illuminate the 
previously underexplored world of government contracts. 
Our manuscript builds on the rich literature on the determinants and consequences of firm 
misbehavior. Prior research focuses on financial reporting misbehavior. For example, firm 
characteristics are a consistent and economically meaningful predictor of financial misbehavior 
ranging from earnings management to internal control issues and outright securities fraud (e.g., 
Jones, 1991; Bell and Carcello, 2000; Gunny, 2010; Dechow et al., 2011; and Donelson et al., 
2017). Additionally, this stream of research investigates characteristics of the auditor and other 
enforcement bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, and finds that factors as 
divergent as auditor risk exposure, auditor specialization, and regulator workload affect the 
probability of firm-level misbehavior (e.g., Gunny and Hermis, 2020; Correia, 2014; Blankley et 
al., 2012; Hogan and Wilkins 2008). Taken together, the results in prior literature demonstrate 
that, subject to sufficiently high capital market pressures and a sufficiently low probability of 
being caught, firms will manipulate their reported numbers. Although it is theoretically likely 
that firms will behave in a similar fashion when conducting their business with major customers, 
prior literature is silent on that issue. Our paper seeks to address this gap in a setting where 
misbehavior ranges from minor statutory violations to egregious misconduct like the Kitrel 
example. 
 
2.0 Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Federal contracting overview 
The Federal contracting process is initiated with the issuance of a Request for Proposal 
(RFP), a document that describes the nature of the goods and services the government wishes to 
 
 
purchase. Contractors who wish to bid on an RFP submit full proposals that include information 
such as price estimates, technical expertise, and a description of prior performance on similar 
government and commercial contracts. A government official, known as the Contracting Officer 
or CO, will award the contract in accordance with relevant regulation and according to the terms 
stated in the RFP. For contracts that are not required (either by the RFP or because of regulation) 
to be awarded to the lowest cost bidder, award decisions are generally based on a combination of 
technical proficiency, bid price, and performance history on similar government contracts. 
Statutory regulations heavily influence the contract award process. The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) forms the primary statutory basis for contract awards; the FAR is 
supplemented by agency-specific regulations, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (DFAR) for the Department of Defense.  
After the contract is awarded, the CO monitors the contractor’s ongoing performance. The 
FAR and supplemental regulations govern not only the award process, but also post-award 
performance. For example, contractors working on contracts in excess of $750,000 are required 
to comply with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), which govern how the contractor prepares 
incurred cost submissions to submit to the government for cost reimbursement. The corpus of 
contracting law contains a number of proscribed behaviors, ranging from minor technical 
violations such as submitting costs without sufficient supporting documentation to instances of 
outright fraud, such as invoicing the government for services that were never provided. Penalties 
for violating the statutes surrounding contracting range from minor fines and revenue forfeitures 
to criminal proceedings and imprisonment.  
Given misbehavior of sufficient severity, contractors can be debarred, meaning the Federal 
government will no longer do business with them. In practice, the procuring agency can and 
 
 
often does petition for a debarment exception that allows the award of a contract to a debarred 
contractor. Data on debarments is not publicly-available, but an industry expert with whom we 
spoke said debarments and subsequent exceptions are not unheard of.  
Having dispensed with this brief overview of the contracting process, we now turn our 
attention to reviewing prior research.  
2.2 Literature Review 
 We build on the ample prior literature related to the determinants and consequences of 
financial reporting misconduct. Extant literature finds that firms exhibit a higher propensity to 
engage in instances of misbehavior varying from relatively minor infractions (such as accruals 
management) to fraudulent financial reporting when capital market pressures incentivize them to 
do so. For example, Jones (1991) reports in her seminal study that firms duck down earnings via 
downward accruals management when undergoing import relief investigations. Sloan (1996) 
finds that the market consistently misprices accruals relative to cash flows, giving firms a strong 
incentive and opportunity to manage earnings to benchmarks using accruals manipulation. In 
addition to accruals manipulation, firms engage in real earnings management via discretionary 
expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenses and also shift operating 
income expenses to non-core income to meet the market’s earnings expectations (Gunny, 2010; 
McVay, 2006). Cross-sectional research demonstrates that earnings volatility is more 
pronounced for fiscal year earnings than for altenate 12-month periods ending in quarters one, 
two, or three of the fiscal year, consistent with widescale prevalence of within GAAP earnings 
management (Gunny et al., 2013). 
 With regard to fraudulent violations of securities law, characteristics of both registrants 
and regulators predict the likelihood of fraud and the probability of fraud detection. Firm 
 
 
qualities such as size, financial distress, operational complexity, and the presence of alternative 
monitoring mechanisms (such as strong corporate governance) are predictably associated with 
financial reporting fraud (e.g., Dechow et al., 2011). The greater the intensity of capital market 
pressures facing the firm, the higher the likelihood of fraud commission and the greater the fraud 
severity (e.g., Wang, 2013; Files et al., 2014). 
Not only firm specific factors but also characteristics of regulators impact financial 
reporting misconduct. Gunny and Hermis (2020) report that the busier the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is around the filing date of the firm’s Annual Report on Form 10-
K, the less likelier that firm is to receive a comment letter. DeFond et al. (2018) extends this 
result to the setting of SEC enforcement actions and reports that Big 4 auditors whose offices are 
geographically proximate to the location of the SEC are more likely to issue negative audit 
opinions when the audit client has received prior attention from the regulator. Independent of 
SEC regulatory activities, auditors and boards of directors both provide less stringent regulatory 
oversight during busy periods (e.g., Lopez and Peters, 2012; Fich and Shivdasani, 2012). Taken 
together, these results suggest that regulatory resource constraints interact with registrants’ 
incentives to affect financial reporting misconduct.  
Due to the opacity of Federal government contracting, research into the occurrence and 
consequences of contractor misconduct is relatively rare. However, several recent papers 
partially illuminate the setting of procurement contracts at the Federal level. Cohen and Li 
(2020) report that firms for whom the U.S. government is a major customer face reduced 
demands in uncertainty, which allows these firms to reap efficiency gains from customer-specific 
investments. This result builds on research in the private sector, which reports that having a 
major commercial customer leads to similar organizational improvements as supplier firms build 
 
 
economies of scale and knowledge efficiencies from investing in a primary customer 
(Patatoukas, 2012).  
Given the importance of the government’s business to firms and the deleterious nature of 
repercussions, it remains an open empirical question whether, on average, contractors will 
engage in procurement misbehavior if given the opportunity and motive to do so. Suppliers of 
proprietary and unique goods and services (such as major weapons platforms) exhibit strong 
bargaining power because the government cannot easily replace supplier A with supplier B if 
supplier A behaves deviously (e.g., Mills et al., 2013). The opacity of the contracting 
environment exacerbates agency problems, enhancing the potential for deviant contractor 
behavior (e.g., DeSouza, 1985 and Schapper et al., 2006). As discussed in Section 2.1, the threat 
of debarment is not an unequivocal negative from the contractor’s perspective, particularly if the 
contractor is the sole supplier of the good or service in question. Heese and Cavazos (2019) 
study the setting of fraud allegations against contractors and find that the government continues 
to procure the majority of goods and services from accused contractors subsequent to fraud 
accusations. However, the government does change the monitoring mechanisms embedded in the 
contract in an apparent attempt to constrain subsequent fraud on the part of contractors.  
Ours is the first study to examine cross-sectional determinants of procurement 
misconduct. We differ from prior literature in several ways. First, the FAR specifies 15 
categories of misconduct that cover a spectrum from minor to extreme with regard to the extent 
of the contractor’s misbehavior. While instances of fraud are uniquely entrancing, we know little 
about the setting surrounding the commission of less severe (but still illegal) instances of 
misconduct. Our results extend knowledge in this area by documenting contractor characteristics 
associated with misconduct commission across all 15 categories. Secondly, we control for 
 
 
characteristics of the awarding agency and the contracts themselves. Hansen and Hermis (2020) 
find that certain Federal agencies and the nature of the contract are predictably associated with 
contractor outputs. Related studies largely ignore these inputs, allowing us to draw finer 
conclusions regarding the interaction of contractor, agency, and contract characteristics on the 
commission of misconduct. Finally, we use firms as their own control, mitigating concerns that 
unobservable contractor characteristics contaminate our results. To the extent that a within-
sample research design removes variation of interest, reported parameters represent a 
conservative estimate of the association between our independent variables and contractor 
misbehavior. 
 
3.0 Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample is drawn from three sources: The Project on Government Oversight Federal 
Contractor Misconduct Database (POGO FCMD), the Compustat North America Fundamentals 
Annual File, and the procurement contract awards database found at usaspending.gov. Our goal 
was to form a sample of publicly-traded U.S. Federal government contractors between 2008 and 
2016, including firm-years with and without POGO-identified misconduct6.  
The sample formation broadly involved the following three steps: 1. Identifying 
contractors with at least one instance of procurement contract misconduct during the sample 
period; 2. Intersecting misconduct firms with data from Compustat, and, 3. Collecting data on 
total government contracts and characteristics of the largest contract from usaspending.gov. 
 
6 We started the sample in 2008 because that is the first year for which usaspending.gov data is available. Our 
sample concludes in 2016 because we calculate misconduct commission in a rolling three-year window with the last 
window ending in 2019. 
 
 
We began by collecting an initial sample of all contractors in POGO FCMD between 
2008 and 2019. POGO is a non-partisan organization committed to transparency at all levels of 
the Federal government. The FCMD “…is a compilation of misconduct…committed by the top 
federal government contractors from 1995 to the present.” POGO FCMD data is drawn from 
numerous sources, including government press releases and reports, court documents and 
pleadings, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. FCMD further stratifies 
misconduct into 15 categories, which we present in Table 1 Panel A7. 
 
    Table 1 about here. 
 
 The 15 categories of contractor misconduct that POGO FCMD identifies can be further 
stratified into subcategories of government specific misconduct and general misconduct. 
Government specific misconduct comprises misbehavior that displays a clear conceptual 
connection to the underlying construct of procurement contract fraud. Examples of government 
specific misconduct include government contract fraud, cost and labor mispricing, and poor 
contract performance. We also identify a subset of POGO FCMD contractors who engage in 
what we term general misconduct; this is misbehavior that violates statutory standards imposed 
on government contractors, but the violation need not share a strong theoretical connection to 
activities that fall under the purview of procurement fraud. Examples of general misconduct 
include labor, environment, and human rights related issues. Table 1, Panel A shows that POGO 
FCMD includes 496 contractors with 1,273 instances of misbehavior between 2008 and 2016, of 
 
7 See https://www.contractormisconduct.org/. 
 
 
which 436 (837) instances related to government specific (general) misconduct, including 224 
(272) contractors.  
 To form a panel of firm-years, we begin with the 496 misconduct contractors described in 
Table 1 Panel A. We then multiply 496 by nine (the number of years in the sample period) to 
obtain a list of 4,464 contractor-years (i.e., firm-years) between 2008 and 2016. Because of the 
expansion to nine years, our sample now includes observations with no misconduct. For each of 
the 4,496 firm years generated by the previous step, we then manually match the contractor-year 
to a firm-year in Compustat. This step is critical because not all misbehaving contractors 
included in POGO FCMD are publicly traded. Eliminating privately held contractors leaves an 
intermediate sample of 764 firm-years. We then drop firm-years with incomplete Compustat data 
necessary to calculate our control variables (including prospective, or forward-looking controls), 
leaving 334 firm-years.  
To calculate controls related to government contract characteristics, we searched 
usaspending.gov for all contracts awarded to each parent company and subsidiary for the 334 
remaining observations. For each firm-year, we hand-collected the dollar value of government 
contracts awarded as well as the Federal government agency and contract type for the largest 
contract award from usaspending.gov8. After eliminating firm-years missing critical usaspending 
data as well as eliminating outliers (such as firms with negative government sales), we had a 
final sample of 301 firm-years, including 194 misconduct-years and 107 non-misconduct years, 
 
8 Usaspending.gov is maintained by the Department of Treasury’s Bureau of Fiscal Services. Since 2000, the U.S. 
government has disclosed contract-level information including total value, contractor, and granting agency for 
contracts greater than $25,000. There is a time delay between the contract award date and the reporting date in 
usaspending. The Department of Defense (DoD) enjoys a longer reporting lag than other Federal agencies for 
national security reasons, and classified contracts or contracts whose public reporting might jeopardize security are 
not reported. The Contracting Officer (CO), or government employee responsible for contract administration, is 
responsible for reporting contract updates (known as modifications) to usaspending.gov.  
 
 
comprised of 40 unique publicly-traded contractors. The sample selection is documented in 
Table 2.  
 
     Table 2 about here 
4.0  Research Design 
 We are investigating what firm-specific characteristics predict the commission of 
contractor-related misconduct.  A critical element of this approach is our choice of endogenous 
variable for misconduct.9 Our primary endogenous variables are binary variables that we set 
equal to one if firm i committed at least one instance of government specific (general) 
misconduct in a three-year window around the 10-K filing date for year t, otherwise zero.10 
These are concurrent and prospective variables. For instance, if a firm has misconduct in 2018, 
then the misconduct variable will be one for years 2016, 2017, and 2018. There are two flavors 
of binary variables, government specific misconduct (Misconduct_govt_binary) and general 
misconduct (Misconduct_gen_binary).  Table 1, Panel B shows that 110/301 = 37% (157/301 = 
52%) of our sample has a non-zero government specific (general) misconduct variable. 
 
 
9 Data on the dollar value impact of misconduct instances is arguably a stronger measure of the underlying construct 
of severity. Unfortunately, such data is not available.  
10 We chose to use a three-year window to capture the commission of various misbehaviors because POGO does not 
match misconduct detection dates to the corresponding fiscal year in which the misconduct occurred. For example, 
if POGO reports that firm ABC committed labor related misconduct in 2010, it is possible the misconduct could be 
attributable to work undertaken by ABC in 2010 or pertaining to an earlier fiscal year. It is not uncommon for firms 
to be awarded a federal contract for which work will not start until a later fiscal year, so misconduct in (for example) 
2010, could relate to a contract that was previously awarded but for which substantial work has not yet commenced. 
Finally, the Federal departments that enforce the statutory requirements around government contract award, 
execution, and post-performance monitoring (such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency) face a substantial 
backlog. Based on these factors and related research in SEC enforcement, we use a three-year rolling window to 
capture the commission of contractor misbehavior (e.g., Bozanic et al., 2017). 
 
 
 To answer our research question, we draw on the rich literature regarding the predictors 
and cofactors associated with financial reporting misconduct (e.g., Bao et al., 2020; Bell and 
Carcello, 2000; and Dechow et al., 2011). Our research design is inspired by Donelson et al. 
(2017), who measure the impact of internal control weaknesses on financial reporting fraud11. 
We supplement their model with variables found in Hansen and Hermis (2020), who find that 
certain controls for government contracting-specific behavior predict contractor-level outcomes. 
These controls include total government sales, the awarding agency on the contract, and whether 
the contract is for goods and services or research and development work. Our baseline logit 
model is specified as follows: 
Pr(Govt_Specific_Misconduct/General_Misconduct) =  
β0  + β1Ln_Marketcapi,t + β2ΑggregateLossi,t + β3Ln_Segmentsi,t + β4Foreign_Curi,t  
+ β5Ext_Sales_Growthi,t + β6Mergeri,t + β7Restructurei,t + β8FScore i,t+ β9Ln_GovSalesi,t 
+ β10TopAgencyi,t + β11Gov_Servicei,t + β12Gov_RDi,t + β13Yeart  + ei,t  (1) 
 
 A brief overview of all variables in equation (1) follows12. The variable 
Govt_Specific_Misconduct (General_Misconduct) is a binary outcome variable equal to one if 
contractor i committed government specific (general) misconduct in a three-year window around 
the 10-K filing date for year t, otherwise zero.  Ln_Marketcap is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization; AggregateLoss is an indicator variable equal to one if the total of income before 
extraordinary items for firm i in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero, zero otherwise. 
 
11 Donelson et al. included controls for Big 4 auditor, auditor resignations, and internal control weaknesses. We 
eliminated these from our model because all of our sample firms used Big 4 auditors, there were no auditor 
resignations, and fewer than three percent of firms in the final sample experienced any weakness related to internal 
controls over financial reporting. 
12 Appendix A contains full definitions of all variables. 
 
 
Ln_Segments is the natural logarithm of operating and geographic segments; ForeignCur is a 
binary variable equal to one if firm i has a non-zero foreign currency translation adjustment, 
otherwise zero. Ext_Sales_Growth equals one if the year-over-year adjusted sales growth for 
firm i falls into the top quintile for that thre -digit NAICS industry-year. Merger is equal to one if 
the firm has a non-zero acquisition expense, else Merger equals zero. Restructure is the 
aggregate restructuring charges for firm i in years t and t-1, scaled by firm i’s market 
capitalization. F-Score is the predicted probability of financial reporting fraud using the model 
found in Dechow et al. (2011), divided by the unconditional financial reporting fraud rate of 
0.0037 found in the same paper; LnGovSales is the natural logarithm of firm i’s government 
sales,  TopAgency is a series of indicator variables for the awarding agency of firm i’s largest 
government contract in year t, and GovService(GovRD) are indicators equal to one if firm i’s 
largest government contract in year t was for services (research and development), otherwise 
zero.  Year are yearly dummies.   
 To accurately capture the determinants of contractor misbehavior, we must match 
treatment (misbehaving) firm-years with a control group of government contractor firms13. 
Specifically, our approach is driven by the relative scarcity of publicly traded government 
contractors not mentioned in POGO FCMD. Few government contractors are reported in 
Compustat (relative to the universe of all contractors), and those few are already well represented 
in our sample, leaving a scarcity of out-of-sample contractors to serve as well-behaved controls. 
 
13 The institutional features of government contracting, such as the prevalence of one major customer and the 
preponderance of associated regulations, renders contractors substantially different from non-contractors. For this 
reason, using non-contractors in the control group would not appropriately capture observable and unobservable 
variation in firm-level characteristics. 
 
 
Our approach is to start with the Universe of contractors in POGO FCMD and then 
narrow the list to those with both Compustat and usaspending.gov data14.  Our data collection 
and analysis generates a set of firm data both with and without specified misconduct (see Table 
1, Panel B).  The post-collection universe contains three types of firms: firms with no 
misconduct for all years they are in the sample, firms with misconduct for every year they are in 
the sample, and firms who sometimes have misconduct and sometimes do not (See Table 1, 
Panel C).  We use a blend of both between- and within-subject experimental design that includes 
each of these three groups.  Firms who sometimes have misconduct use the firm as its own 
control. The spell of no-misconduct controls for the spell of misconduct.  Using the firm as its 
own control theoretically holds constant unobservable but important determinants of the 
propensity to engage in contracting misconduct.  Firms who have no misconduct serve as 
controls for firms who always have misconduct.   
 As a robustness test, we investigate a finer version of our binary endogenous variables.  
Prior research finds that even among misbehaving firms, the severity and extent of misconduct 
varies widely (e.g., Gunny and Hermis, 2020 and Correia, 2014). We therefore parse the 
commission of either government specific or general misconduct into finer categories based on 
the number of occurrences of misconduct recorded in POGO for firm i in a three-year period 
around year t. Specifically, we create the trinary variable Misconduct_govt_trinary 
(Misconduct_gen_trinary) that is equal to zero if firm i committed no misconduct in the three 
 
14 Like many studies where the outcome variable is not fully observable, our research design faces the challenge of 
partial observability. We can safely assume that firms in POGO FCMD misbehaved, but it is unclear whether firms 
not in POGO were well behaved or engaged in misconduct but the misconduct was undetected. Ignoring partial 
observability can bias estimators in many empirical specifications (Poirier, 1980). However, barring systematic bias 
in the omission of misbehavior instances from POGO FCMD, the partial observability problem is more likely to add 
noise than directional bias (either for or against finding a statistically significant result).  
 
 
year window; one if firm i committed only one instance of government specific (general) 
misconduct in the three-year window, and equal to two if firm i committed two or more instances 
of government specific (general) misconduct in the three-year window. Measuring the number of 
misconduct occurrences this way allows us to draw finer conclusions about the factors driving 
the commission of occasional misbehavior versus the determinants of persistently deviant 
contract-related conduct. Table 1, Panel D contains the data on our trinary variable.   
 
5.0 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1, Panel A describes instances of general and government specific misconduct 
identified in POGO FCMD between 2008 and 201915. Panel A shows that 74 contractors 
committed 165 instances of government specific misconduct during this time frame, and 100 
firms committed 356 occurrences of general misconduct. Misbehavior examples identified total 
to  174 contractors committing 521 instances of POGO-identified contractor misconduct. Due to 
significant overlap among the commission of both general and government specific misconduct 
within a firm-year, the final sample of contractor misbehavior included in empirical analyses 
contains 40 unique contractors who committed 194 instances of misconduct. 
 
 The differing regulatory environments and procurement requirements among Federal 
government agencies naturally raises the question of whether certain Federal agencies are likely 
to experience a higher propensity towards contractor misbehavior. To address this question, we 
 
15 The sample period ends in 2016, but we measure misconduct in a three-year window. 
 
 
reported the number of government specific and general misconduct instances attributable to 
contracts from each Federal agency in our final sample for the entire misconduct window. These 
frequencies are reported in Figure 1.  
 
     Figure 1 about here  
 
 As we can see in Figure 1, the relative occurrence of government and general misconduct 
varies greatly from agency to agency. The varying budgets and nature of procurements 
attributable to different agencies is the most likely explanation for this result16.  
 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of 301 observations for 40 unique 
firms. Our sample contains firms which are comparatively large in both the stock market 
(median Ln_Marketcap is 10.441) and in government contracting (median Ln_Govsales is 
7.5292). One other control variable is work discussing. The F-score is a measure of the probably 
of securities fraud and is scaled so that a firm with a score of 1.0 has the median probability of 
committing fraud.  Our sample is unusual in that the highest value of F-score in our sample is an 
untabulated 0.98, which means that every observation in our sample has below median 
probability of securities fraud.  
 
5.2 Main results 
 Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using three specifications of the 
dependent variable:  government specific binary misconduct, general binary misconduct, and any 
 
16For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the largest Federal agency by spending, 
responsible for  27.5% of aggregate expenditures in fiscal year 2020 (usaspending.gov). 
 
 
(either general or government specific) binary misconduct. For all three specifications in Table 4, 
the coefficients on contractor size (Ln_Marketcap), operational complexity (proxied by 
Restructure), and the extent of the firm’s total sales to the government (Ln_Govsales) display 
consistent and statistically significant explanatory power with regard to contractor misconduct. 
The coefficients for Ln_Marketcap and Ln_Govsales are both positively significant, consistent 
with larger firms and firms who engage in more government sales displaying a higher propensity 
to engage in procurement misbehavior.  
The coefficient on Restructure is significantly negative in Table 4, suggesting that firms 
with a greater degree of operational complexity, represented by the presence of non-zero 
restructuring charges, have a lower propensity to exhibit procurement misconduct. The negative 
association between Restructure and misconduct is initially puzzling. However, to the extent that 
contractors with opaque operating environments are already subject to greater contract oversight 
due to the complexity of their operational milieu, the negative coefficient on Restructure 
reported in all three specifications of equation (1) reported in Table 4 are unsurprising17.  The 
presence of strong oversight mechanisms plausibly explains the persistent, negative and 
significant coefficients on DHS and DoD also displayed in Table 4. To the extent that strong 
monitors reduce a contractor’s ex ante likelihood of engaging in misconduct, contractors who 
work for agencies with high bargaining power face incentives to comply with applicable rules 
and regulations throughout the entire contracting process. 
 
17 Federal contractors face a significant burden to comply with statutory guidance around government procurements, 
including the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), agency-specific FAR supplements, and the Cost Accounting 
Standards (CAS). Additionally, the government retains the right to review contract performance on an as-needed or 
ex post basis and can require the return of previously disbursed revenues. The regulatory and institutional 
environment surrounding government procurement activities collectively form an oversight function with regard to 
the behavior of contractor firms. 
 
 
Table 5 Panel A estimates a multinomial logit version of equation (1) using our trinary 
government specific misconduct dependent variable. The results reported in Table 5 Panel A are 
largely identical to those in Table 4, with the addition of GSA (the Government Services 
Administration) as a consistent factor predicting a lower likelihood of both relative mild (zero to 
one occurrences) and more severe (two or more occurrences) of misconduct. For the sake of 
parsimony, we will avoid a detailed discussion of coefficients reported in Table 5 Panel A. 
Taken together, both specifications of equation (1) presented in this table suggest that larger and 
more government-focused contractors are more likely to engage in misconduct, while firms 
whose business centers around Federal agencies with strong purchasing power (and, by 
extension, powerful oversight mechanisms) face a reduced incentive to misbehave. Finally, 
Table 5 Panel B reports the joint test of coefficient equality between the two versions of equation 
(1) reported in Panel A. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of the equivalence of the 
coefficient of Ln_Govsales in both specifications estimated in Panel A of this table. The rejection 
of the null hypothesis is intuitively appealing and consistent with the prediction that the extent of 
the contractor’s total sales to the Federal government is a critical predictor of not only the 
propensity to engage in misconduct,  but also the severity of misconduct.  
Finally, we estimate equation (1) using the trinary specification of general misconduct 
stratified by misconduct severity, similar to the regressions on trinary government specific 
misconduct described above. These results are reported in Table 6 Panel A and largely imitate 
those presented in Table 4 and Table 5 Panel A, with the notable exception that Ln_Govsales is 
only significant in the most egregious cases of general misconduct, while the same cofactor is 
not statistically significant for less severe instances of misbehavior. Similar to Table 5 Panel B, 
 
 
Table 6 Panel B allows us to reject the null hypothesis of coefficient equality on Ln_Govsales 
between low and high severity cases of government misconduct.  
Taken together, the results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 suggest that firm size, extent of 
government business, and awarding agency consistently and significantly impact the commission 
of government specific and general contractor misconduct. Given the reduced budgets and 
ballooning requirements of Federal agencies, the ability to efficiently focus oversight on 
contractors with the highest ex ante probability of misbehavior will allow the government to 
maximize the value and efficiency of each dollar of marginal revenue. These results should be of 
interest to policy makers responsible for setting priorities with regard to procurement oversight 
mechanisms and resource allocations. 
 
5.3 Limitations of results 
 As discussed in Section 3.0, we use a blended research design with both with-in and 
between-subject controls.  Overall, our data collection began with firms who exhibited 
misconduct and ended with firms who had no misconduct, firms who always had misconduct, 
and firms who had spells with and without misconduct.   
 Our discussion of limitations will initially focus on the groups of firms with spells with 
and without misconduct.  For those firms, each firm is its own control. In technical parlance, this 
is known as a within-subjects experimental decline. The within-subjects design we used is 
significantly advantageous because is removes across-subject (i.e., cross-sectional) variation, 
providing a more powerful statistical test and reassurance that unobservable firm-specific 
artifacts drive our empirical results.  
 
 
However, this same research design suffers from several confounding effects. Firstly, the 
practice effect suggests that treated subjects learn from receiving the treatment over time and 
acquire information and knowledge that alter their relationship with the treatment in the future. 
In our setting, this could manifest as firms misbehaving once, getting caught, and then either not 
misbehaving or misbehaving in such a way that they do not get caught. Such practice effects and 
attendant knowledge acquisition are artifacts of the firm’s information environment, and these 
unobservable firm effects are mitigated to the extent possible by the use of each firm as its own 
control. 
 Within-subject designs may also suffer from carryover effects that occur when the effect 
of treatment n for firm i persists and contaminates the delivery of subsequent treatments to that 
same firm.  In our case, firms who engage in several instances of misconduct, either 
simultaneously or in rapid suggestion, could face lingering operational and financial pressures 
that contribute to or arise from the treatment, contaminating inferences drawn from subsequent 
analyses on that firm. To the extent that our sample firms misbehave but their misconduct is 
detected, carryover effects are more likely to introduce noise and are unlikely to systematically 
bias our empirical results. Additionally, Greenwald (1976) suggests that carryover effects can be 
reduced by separating the treatments in time. As long as the treatment (i.e., misconduct) does not 
impose permanent effects, the use of a long time-series panel helps reduce these concerns. In 
other words, as long as contractors are not permanently, inalterably, and radically deviant, using 
an eight-year panel should be significant to mitigate carryover threats18. 
 
 
18 Within-subjects designs may also face sensitization, which is when the individual or firm learns from the 
treatment and predicts the outcome of the experiment. This is more of a concern in experimental research, so we do 
not consider it here. 
 
 
 Our sample also contains firms which always committed misconduct and those who 
never committed misconduct.  This portion of our sample exhibits across-subject variation which 
increases the noise in our estimation.  However, there is one compensating factor. In order for a 
firm to be in our sample they must have shown up in POGO as having committed misconduct 
during 2008 – 2016.  For firms with no misconduct in our sample, the misconduct year(s) 
dropped due to missing data. So those observations with no misconduct have had misconduct in 
our sample period but not in our sample.   
 Rather than using our approach, we could have chosen an out-of-sample design by 
forming a control based on something akin to propensity score matching19. We chose not to 
pursue this course of action because few government contractors are publicly traded, with data 
reported in Compustat, and those few who do have Compustat data are already included in our 
sample. Speaking plainly, we did not have sufficient data to construct an out-of-sample control 
group. Taken together, the limitations on our chosen research design do not subsume the validity 
or robustness of our empirical results. We have dealt with them to the extent possible, but we 
recommend some caution when interpreting results. Of course, further research will be a most 




This paper examines the characteristics of the firms and agencies associated with federal 
contracting misconduct. Using the POGO database together with detailed contract-specific 
 
19 See Armstrong et al. 2010. 
 
 
information, we find that firm size, extent of government business, and awarding agency 
consistently and significantly impact the commission of government specific and general 
contractor misconduct. 
Our study contributes to both the corporate fraud and contracting literatures. It expands 
the literature on corporate fraud by identifying firm traits that are associated with the commission 
of federal contracting misconduct. It contributes to the contracting misconduct by providing 
evidence that there are agency specific characteristics that may be conducive to a misconduct-
friendly environment. 
The worldwide coronavirus pandemic is likely to exert significant budgetary pressures at 
all levels of the government, forcing agencies to more diligently maximize the value obtained for 
each dollar of procurements. As the government contends with these fiscal pressures, it behooves 
policy makers to understand the conditions under which business partners are likely to 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Misconduct_govt_binary An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i committed government 
specific misconduct (government contract fraud, ethics, cost/labor 
mischarge, defective pricing, or poor contract performance) within 
three years of the 10-K filing date for year t, otherwise 0. (POGO 
FCMD) 
Misconduct_gen_binary An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i committed general 
misconduct (import/export, intellectual property, labor, 
environmental, human rights, securities, tax, antitrust, or health) 
within three years of the 10-K filing date for year t, otherwise 0. 
(POGO FCMD) 
Misconduct_govt_trinary An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i committed one instance of 
government specific misconduct within three years of the 10-K 
filing date for year t; equal to 2 if firm i committed more than one 
reported government specific misconduct within three years of the 
10-K filing date for year t; otherwise 0. (POGO FCMD) 
Misconduct_gen_trinary An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i committed one instance of 
general misconduct three years of the 10-K filing date for year t; 
equal to 2 if firm i committed instance general misconduct within 
three years of the 10-K filing date (plus seven days of the firm’s 
audited financial statements) for year t; otherwise 0. (POGO 
FCMD)  
Ln_Marketcap The natural logarithm of market capitalization, (Compustat: 
PRCC_F * CSHO) 
Aggregate_Loss An indicator variable equal to 1 if the total of income before 
extraordinary items in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero 
otherwise 0. (Compustat: IBt+IBt-1< 0) 
Ln_Segments The natural logarithm of the number of operating and geographic 
segments. (Compustat) 
Foreign_Cur An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a non-zero foreign 
currency translation adjustment, otherwise 0. (Compustat: FCA) 
Ext_Sales_Growth An indicator variable equal to 1 if the year-over-year three digit 
Naics industry-adjusted sales growth falls into the top quintile for 
the industry-year, otherwise 0. (Compustat: SALE) 
Merger An indicator equal to 1 if firm i has non-zero acquisition expenses 
in year t, otherwise 0. (Compustat: AQP) 
Restructure Firm i’s aggregate restructuring charge (Compustat: RCP * -1) in 
years t and t-1 scaled by market capitalization in year t. 
(Compustat: CSHO * PRCC_F) 
Fscore The predicted probability from Model (1) of Dechow et al. (2011) 




Ln_Govsales The natural logarithm of the total value of all government contracts 
signed by firm i in year t (usaspending.gov) 
GovService An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s largest government 
contract in year t is for a service, otherwise 0. (usaspending.gov) 
GovRD An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s largest government 
contract for year t is for research and development, otherwise 0. 
(usaspending.gov) 
DoJ An indicator variable equal to 1 the awarding agency for firm i’s 
largest government contract in year t  is the U.S. Department of 
Justice, otherwise 0. (usaspending.gov) 
GSA An indicator variable equal to 1 the awarding agency for firm i’s 
largest government contract in year t  is the U.S. General Services 
Administration, otherwise 0. (usaspending.gov) 
DHS An indicator variable equal to 1 the awarding agency for firm i’s 
largest government contract in year t  is the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, otherwise 0. (usaspending.gov) 
 
HHS An indicator variable equal to 1 the awarding agency for firm i’s 
largest government contract in year t  is the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, otherwise 0. (usaspending.gov) 
 
DoE An indicator variable equal to 1 the awarding agency for firm i’s 
largest government contract in year t  is the U.S. Department of 
Education, otherwise 0. (usaspending.gov) 
 
DoD An indicator variable equal to 1 the awarding agency for firm i’s 
largest government contract in year t  is the U.S. Department of 






Figure 1.  Misconducts by Government Agency by Fiscal Year 






Two or More 
Misconducts 
DoJ 9 Govt specific 7 1 1 
  General 5 3 1 
GSA 13 Govt specific 10 2 1 
  General 4 6 3 
DHS 15 Govt specific 10 4 1 
  General 6 6 3 
HHS 35 Govt specific 21 12 2 
  General 8 8 19 
DoE 7 Govt specific 3 2 2 
  General 1 4 2 
DoD 193 Govt specific 125 47 21 
  General 107 39 47 
 





Table 1. Program on Government Oversight Misconduct Data 2008-2019* 
 
Panel A. Data on Misconduct 
  Initial  Sample   









Govt Contract Fraud  104 250 30 88  
Ethics  49 79 19 34  
Cost/Labor Mischarge  21 26 8 14  
Defective Pricing  4 4 3 3  
Poor Contract Perf  46 77 14 26  
Total Government 
Specific  224 436 74 165  
       
General       
Import/Export  15 19 6 6  
Intellectual Property  12 21 3 5  
Labor  100 402 28 144  
Environment  34 124 16 65  
Human Rights  1 2 1 1  
Securities  31 63 11 15  
Tax  4 5 3 3  
Antitrust  35 75 14 33  
Health  40 126 18 84  
Total General   272 837 100 356  
       
Total All   496 1273 174 521  
       
*We have excluded the category "other".     
 
There is significant overlap between sample contractors.  There are only 40 individual 
contractors in our final sample. There is also a significant overlap in instances occurring in a 
year.  There are only 194 misconduct observations in our final sample. 
 
Panel B. Sample Yearly Observations by Misconduct Type, N = 301 
 
 
Panel C.  
Sample  






No Gov specific Misconduct 107 84 191 
Gov specific Misconduct 37 73 110 




Panel C. Yearly Observations by Category, N =301 
    No Misconduct      Mixed Always Misconduct 
Government Specific  83   173  45 
General    130   150  21 
 












in a 3 year 
window 
General Misconduct 85 74 142 





Table 2. Sample Creation 
       Reduction Remaining 
Pogo firms for 2008 – 2016 (496 x 9)     4,464 
Less 
Not on Compustat     3,700         764 
Missing Compustat Items       427      337 
Missing Usaspending.gov items        21      316 
Oultiers (Ex. negative gov sales)        15      301 




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (N = 301) 
 
Variable  Mean Std 
Deviation 
25th  50th  75th  
Independent Variables      
Misconduct_govt_binary 0.6545 0.4763 0 1 1 
Misconduct_gen_binary 0.7176 0.4509 0 1 1 
Misconduct_govt_trinary 0.9136 0.7740 0 1 2 
Misconduct_gen_trinary 1.1894 0.8489 0 1 2 
Dependent Variables      
Ln_Marketcap 10.043 1.9894 8.4359 10.441 11.692 
Aggregate_Loss 0.0332 0.1795 0 0 0 
Ln_segments 2.1755 0.4454 1.9459 2.1972 2.4849 
Foreign_Cur 0.2259 0.4189 0 0 0 
Ext_Sales_Growth 0.0532 0.2247 0 0 0 
Merger 0.0631 0.2436 0 0 0 
Restructure 0.0104 0.0460 0 0 0.0071 
Fscore 0.4783 0.1795 0.3324 0.4925 0.6091 
Ln_Govsales 7.5313 2.5448 6.1139 7.5292 9.0833 
GovService 0.0299 0.1706 0 0 0 
GovRD 0.1694 0.3757 0 0 0 
DoJ 0.0299 0.1706 0 0 0 
GSA 0.0432 0.2036 0 0 0 
DHS 0.0498 0.2180 0 0 0 
HHS 0.1163 0.3211 0 0 0 
DoE 0.0233 0.1510 0 0 0 





Table 4. Logit Results for Binary Endogenous Variables (N = 301) 
 
 Government Specific 
Binary, 1 = 
Misconduct 
General Binary, 
1 = Misconduct 
Any Misconduct  








































































































    
Pseudo R2 0.2325 0.2109 0.2452 




Yearly dummies included. DoJ and DoE perfectly predict outcomes for General, Binary and Any 
Misconduct, Binary and are excluded.  
*** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
 
 
Table 5. Multinomial Logit Results for Trinary Govt Specific (N = 301) 
 
Panel A. Estimation Results 
 









































































   
Pseudo R2 0.2073  
 
 
N 301  
 
 
Yearly dummies included.  
*** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level 
Panel B. Tests of Equality of Coefficients  
 Outcome (2) – Outcome (1) = 0 
 Coefficient 






































Table 6. Multinomial Logit Results for Trinary General (N = 301) 
 









































































   
Pseudo R2 0.2406  
N 301  
 
 
Yearly dummies included.  
*** (**) [*] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
Panel B. Tests of Equality of Coefficients  
 Outcome (2) – Outcome (1) = 0 
 Coefficient 
(Prob > ChiSquare) 
Ln_marketcap 0.1567 
(0.219) 
Ag_loss -1.0611 
(0.314) 
Ln_seg 1.4508*** 
(0.002) 
Foreigncurrency -0.2157 
(0.608) 
Ext_Sales_Grow 0.7416 
(0.422) 
Merger -0.4546 
(0.559) 
Restructure -3.5400 
(0.749) 
Fscore -3.7844*** 
(0.006) 
Ln_govsales 0.2715*** 
(0.001) 
Gov_service -0.5542 
(0.545) 
Gov_RD 0.3423 
(0.500) 
DoJ -2.7346** 
(0.019) 
GSA -2.7068*** 
(0.003) 
DHS -2.9820*** 
 
 
(0.002) 
HHS 1.2610 
(0.208) 
DoE -0.8175 
(0.473) 
DoD -1.486** 
(0.025) 
 
 
